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FOURTH AMENDMENT-PROTECTION
AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEIZURES
OF THE PERSON: THE
INTRUSIVENESS OF DRAGNET
STYLED DRUG SWEEPS
Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Florida v. Bostick,I the United States Supreme Court held that
the Fourth Amendment does not per se prohibit law-enforcement of-
ficers from conducting random sweeps of intrastate or interstate
buses in search of drugs. In making its decision, the Court adopted
a variation of its earlier "free to leave" test, which permits an officer
to question a person without reasonable suspicion as long as a rea-
sonable person would feel free to walk away. 2 The Court here found
that the proper test for police encounters aboard buses is "whether
a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers' requests
or otherwise terminate the encounter."3
This Note traces the origins of the "free to leave" test and the
subsequent case law. This Note argues that the Court continues to
rely on a test that is difficult to apply and leaves too much discretion
to the courts. This Note also maintains that the Court has failed to
provide proper guidance to law enforcement officials as to the con-
duct required to prevent consensual encounters with individuals
from becoming unreasonable or unlawful seizures. Furthermore,
this Note discusses the possible social consequences of the Court's
decision. Finally, this Note suggests that a more appropriate test for
bus encounters is one that considers the objective intent of the
officers.
II. BACKGROUND
In an effort to combat drug trafficking between "source" cities
in this country, law-enforcement officials have engaged in dragnet
1 1I S. Ct. 2382 (1991).
2 Id. at 2386-87.
3 Id. at 2387.
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styled sweeps of intrastate and interstate buses.4 In a typical dragnet
sweep, the officers randomly board buses at stopovers and then
without any suspicion select passengers for questioning.5 After
identifying themselves as police officers, the officers check the pas-
senger's identification against his or her ticket.6 Regardless of the
results of this check, the officers proceed to ask for consent to
search the passenger's luggage for drugs. 7 This type of police-citi-
zen encounter raises a Fourth Amendment concern over whether
such an encounter is an unreasonable (or unlawful) seizure of the
person.8
A. FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE AND THE TERRY DOCTRINE
1. Fourth Amendment Protection
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
tects individuals from unwarranted intrusions into their personal
privacy and security:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 9
The strongest protection against searches and seizures is found
in the Warrant Clause of the Amendment. Before a law-enforce-
ment officer can conduct a search or seizure, he or she must follow
the warrant procedure which requires the officer to show probable
cause and to obtain a specific warrant from a magistrate. 10 However,
as the Court noted in Terry v. Ohio, I" obtaining a warrant in advance
is only necessary when practical, 12 and can be "excused by exigent
circumstances."'13 The Terry Court further observed that historically
4 Id. at 2389-90 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
5 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
6 Id. at 2390 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
7 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
8 If an unreasonable seizure occurs prior to a person's consent to search, any evi-
dence obtained during the unlawful search is inadmissible at trial, unless there is an
intervening event that breaks the connection between the officer's illegal conduct and
the person's consent. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501 (1983); Dunaway v. New York,
442 U.S. 200, 218-19 (1979).
9 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
10 See Katz v United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1967); Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963).
11 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
12 See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 357-59; Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 615
(1961).
13 See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967).
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and as a practical matter, officers on patrol have not been subjected
to the warrant procedure when immediate action is required to in-
vestigate possible criminal activity.' 4 Instead, the officers' conduct
must be judged "by the Fourth Amendment's general proscription
against unreasonable searches and seizures." 15 Prior to Terry, any
seizure of the person was "unreasonable" pursuant to the Fourth
Amendment, unless the seizure was justified by probable cause to
arrest for a crime. 16 There is probable cause when an objective and
cautious interpretation of reasonably trustworthy information ob-
tained by the officer warrants one to believe that a crime has been or
is being committed by the person to be arrested.' 7
2. The Terry Doctrine
Providing an exception to the general rule requiring probable
cause, the Terry Court articulated a two prong balancing test to de-
termine the reasonableness of a search and seizure. 18 First, a police
officer's actions must be justified at its inception, 19 i.e., the govern-
ment's interests must on balance warrant the particular intrusion
upon a person's privacy. Second, the scope of the search and
seizure must be reasonable under the circumstances. 20
The Court in Terry held that a police officer, who has reasonable
suspicion that "criminal activity was afoot," can seize a suspect and
conduct a limited search to determine if the suspect is armed, in
order to protect himself and others nearby. 2' The Court limited its
holding to cases where a police officer stops and frisks a suspect for
weapons. 22 But in subsequent decisions the Court expanded its
14 Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
15 Id.
16 Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979).
17 Id. at 208 n.9 (1979).
18 Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
19 Id.
20 Id. The Court explained that "in justifying the particular intrusion the police of-
ficer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Id. at 21.
21 Id. at 30. In Terry, a police officer, who was walking a beat, noticed three men,
including Terry, acting as if they were planning to rob a store. Id. at 6. The officer
approached the men, and identified himself as a police officer before asking for their
names. Id. at 6-7. When the men "mumbled something" in response to his inquiries,
the officer grabbed Terry, patted down the outside of his clothing, and found a gun in
the breast pocket of Terry's overcoat. Id. at 7.
The Court noted that "[tihe solejustification of the search in the present situation is
the protection of the police officer and others nearby, and it must therefore be confined
in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other
hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer." Id. at 29.
22 Id. at 15.
1992] 799
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
holding to include temporary seizures for the sole purpose of ques-
tioning when an officer has "reasonable suspicion" that illegal activ-
ity is involved, and the officer has limited his conduct to the purpose
of the stop. 2 3 For example, an officer can legally stop a vehicle, near
the border, for limited questioning to dispel reasonable suspicion
that immigration laws are being violated, but without additional ar-
ticulable facts or consent, the officer cannot legally conduct a search
of that vehicle or detained them for some other reason. 24
The Court in Terry, however, failed to articulate a standard for
determining when a seizure occurs. Since the seizure of Terry was
obvious given that the officer grabbed and searched him 25 and be-
cause the record was unclear as to the antecedent events, the Court
declined to rule on whether a seizure had occurred prior to that
point.26 However, in dicta the Court suggested that "not all per-
sonal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves 'seizures'
of persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or
show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen
may we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred." 27
Additional support for this proposition is found in the Terry
concurrences. "There is nothing in the Constitution which prevents
a policeman from addressing questions to anyone on the streets." 28
"Any person, including a policeman, is at liberty .... to address
questions to other persons, for ordinarily the person addressed has an
equal right to ignore his interrogator and walk away."29
B. DETERMINING WHEN A SEIZURE OCCURS: THE MENDENHALL-ROYER
'FREE TO LEAVE" TEST
1. The "Free to Leave Test"
Not until twelve years after Terry did the Court announce a gen-
eral rule for determining when a seizure of the person occurs. In
23 See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-82 (1975).
24 Id.
25 Terry, 392 U.S. at 19. The Court stated that "[i]n this case there can be no ques-
tion... that [the police officer] 'seized' [Terry] and subjected him to a 'search' when he
took hold of him and patted down the outer surfaces of his clothing." Id.
26 Id. at 19 n.16. The Court explained:
We cannot tell with any certainty upon this record whether any such "seizure" took
place here prior to Officer McFadden's initiation of physical contact for purposes of
searching Terry for weapons, and we thus may assume that up to that point no
intrusion upon constitutionally protected rights had occurred.
Id.
27 Id. at 19 n.16.
28 Id. at 33 (White, J., concurring).
29 Id. at 32-33 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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United States v. Mendenhall, °Justice Stewart, writing for a two person
plurality in which only Justice Rehnquist joined, held that "a person
has been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only
if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave." 3' Prior to Justice Stewart's pronouncement of the "free to
leave" test, the Court had no occasion to hold, except in vehicle
stop cases,3 2 that a seizure of person occurred solely because of an
30 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
31 Id. at 554 (opinion of Stewart, J.). In Mendenhall, two DEA agents using a drug
profile selected Mendenhall for questioning, after she had arrived at the Detroit Metro-
politan Airport on a plane from Los Angeles, and was walking down the airport con-
course. Id. at 547. The agents identified themselves, and at their request Mendenhall
produced her driver's license and airline ticket. Id. at 548. The name on the license and
ticket did not match, and Mendenhall became noticeably nervous when the agents made
further inquiries. Id. at 549. The agents returned the ticket and license to Mendenhall
before asking and receiving consent to conduct further questioning in the airport DEA
office. Id. At the office, Mendenhall consented to a search of her purse, and then later
consented to a search of her person by a female police officer in a private room. Id. As
Mendenhall disrobed she took two packets of heroin from her undergarments. Id.
Justice Powell concurred in the decision, but since neither of the courts below con-
sidered the question of seizure, Justice Powell declined to join Justice Stewart's conclu-
sion that no seizure had occurred. Id at 560 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment). Instead, Justice Powell assumed a seizure had occurred and
argued that, under Terry, the seizure was justified, because the officers had reasonable
suspicion that Mendenhall had engaged in criminal activity. Id. (Powell,J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment) (Justice Powell noted in a footnote that the question
of whether a seizure occurred was an extremely close one).
. On the other hand, the dissent found that Mendenhall had been seized because,
under Terry, any stop by law enforcement implicates Fourth Amendment rights, but the
reasonableness of the intrusion is to be weighed by considering all the circumstances of
the encounter, and that the seizure was unjustified because the dissent did not feel that
the officers had satisfied the reasonable suspicion required to stop someone suspected
of criminal activity. Id. at 567, 573 (White, J., dissenting).
32 Vehicle stops are instances where the police pull a vehicle over for a traffic viola-
tion or for some other reason. In Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984), Justice
Marshall explained why vehicle stops have been categorically recognized as seizure of
the person:
It must be acknowledged at the outset that a traffic stop significantly curtails the
"freedom of action" of the driver and the passengers, if any, of the detained vehicle.
Under the law of most States, it is a crime either to ignore a policeman's signal to
stop one's car or, once having stopped, to drive away without permission. E.g.,
OHio REv. CODE ANN. 4511.02 (1982). Certainly few motorists would feel free
either to disobey a directive to pull over or to leave the scene of a traffic stop with-
out being told they might do so. Partly for these reasons, we have long acknowl-
edged that "stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a
'seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, even though the purpose of
the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief."
Id. at 436-37 (footnotes omitted); see also Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 4 n.3 (1980)
(the Court stated that "[t]here can be no question that the stopping of a vehicle and the
detention of its occupants constitute a 'seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.").
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officer's "show of authority," rather than physical force or contact.33
In delineating when a police encounter becomes within the pur-
view of the Fourth Amendment, Justice Stewart relied on dicta and
concurrences in Terry, that suggested as an alternative to physical
contact, a "show of authority" that caused an individual to involun-
tarily submit to the officer's request would constitute a seizure.3 4
Specifically, Justice Stewart stated "that a person is 'seized' only
when, by means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom
of movement is restrained."3 5 Some examples of circumstances that
might constitute a seizure of the person, even though the individual
did not attempt to walk away are: (1) the threatening presence of
several officers, (2) the display of a weapon by an officer, (3) the
physical touching of the person of the citizen, or (4) the use of lan-
guage or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's
request might be compelled. 36
Justice Stewart rejected a rule that would characterize all street
encounters as seizures.37 He reasoned that such a rule "would im-
pose wholly unrealistic restrictions upon a wide variety of legitimate
law enforcement practices." 38 Hence the policy underlying Justice
Stewart's rule is that police officers need the flexibility to question
people during a criminal investigation without having to justify the
encounter under the Terry balancing test.3 9 Otherwise, "those who
were innocent might be falsely accused, those who were guilty might
wholly escape prosecution, and many crimes would go unsolved. In
short, the security of all would be diminished." 40
Three years later, in Florida v. Royer,41 a majority of the Court
adopted Justice Stewart's "free to leave" test. Justice White, writing
for the plurality,42 ruled that a law enforcement officer's simple
33 See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (where unclear facts prevented the
Court from ruling on whether a seizure occurred prior to the actual physical seizure
required to perform the search); Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (the Court
found that a police office had abruptly seized a fleeing suspect when he grabbed him by
the collar). See also, Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) (officer asked suspect seated
in park car to open door but the suspect rolled down the window instead, so the officer
immediately searched for a gun); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) (officers asked
man in alley for identification and when the man refused to identify himself the officers
frisked him but found nothing).
34 Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 552-53 (opinion of Stewart, J.).
35 Id. at 553 (opinion of Stewart, J.).
36 Id. at 554 (opinion of Stewart, J.).
37 Id. (opinion of Stewart, J.).
38 Id. (opinion of Stewart, J.).
39 Id. (opinion of Stewart, J.).
40 Id. (opinion of Stewart, J.).
41 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (plurality opinion).
42 Justice White was joined by Justices Marshall, Powell and Stevens.
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questioning of an individual was only a consensual encounter and
did not amount to seizure.43 The Court explained:
[L]aw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by
merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public
place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, by put-
ting questions to him if the person is willing to listen, or by offering in
evidence in a criminal prosecution his voluntary answers to such ques-
tions. Nor would the fact that the officer identifies himself as a police
officer, without more, convert the encounter into a seizure requiring
some level of objective justification. 44
Nevertheless, the plurality found that a seizure occurs when law
enforcement officials approach an individual, identify themselves as
narcotic agents, tell the individual he is a suspect, retain the indi-
vidual's identification and fail to advise the individual that he is free
to depart.45 The plurality reasoned that such circumstances
"amount[ed] to a show of official authority such that a 'reasonable
person would have believed that he was not free to leave.' "46
43 Royer, 460 U.S. at 501. In Royer, two plains clothes detectives from the Dade
County, Fla. Sheriff's Department, using a drug courier profile, selected Royer for ques-
tioning, after he had purchased a one-way airline ticket from Miami to New York City.
Id. at 493. On the concourse, the detectives first identified themselves as policemen and
then asked Royer for his drivers license and airline ticket. Id. at 493-94. The name used
on Royer's airline ticket and baggage identification did not match his driver license, and
the officers retained the ticket and license. Id. at 494. Royer became noticeably nervous
during subsequent questioning, and thus the detectives chose to identify themselves as
narcotics officers and told Royer that they suspected him of transporting narcotics. Id.
When the detectives asked Royer to accompany them to a room, which was described as
a large storage closet with a desk and two chairs, they still had not returned Royer's
identification and ticket. Id. After retrieving Royer's luggage without Royer's consent,
the detectives asked for his consent to search the luggage. Using a key given to them by
Royer, the detectives opened the luggage and found marihuana. Id.
The plurality concluded that simply asking to see Royer's driver's license and ticket
did not amount to seizure. Id. at 501 (plurality opinion).
44 Id. at 497 (plurality opinion) (cites omitted) (emphasis added).
45 Id. at 501 (plurality opinion).
46 Id. at 502 (plurality opinion). The plurality also found that the seizure was lawful
up until the officers escorted Royer to the investigation room, since the officers had
reasonable suspicion from observations made of Royer's conduct and the officers dis-
covery that Royer was traveling under an assumed name. Id. (plurality opinion). How-
ever, once Royer was placed in the police room, reasonable suspicion was no longer
enough to detain Royer further given the circumstances (never told him he was free to
leave, still had license and ticket, already had seized luggage, purpose of going to room
was to search luggage but never asked Royer before retrieving it, the room was small
and confining). Id. at 502-08 (plurality opinion). The plurality concluded that Royer was
effectively under arrest; therefore, probable cause and not reasonable suspicion was re-
quired. Id. (plurality opinion).
justice Brennan, in a separate concurrence, agreed that Royer had been seized, but
found that the actual seizure occurred at the time the officers identified themselves and
asked him for his driver's license and airline ticket. Id. at 511 (Brennan,j., concurring in
the result). Justice Powell agreed with the plurality that an unlawful seizure occurred,
but also differed as to when the seizure occurred. Id. at 508-09 (Powell, J., concurring).
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2. Application of the "Free to Leave" Standard
Since Mendenhall and Royer, the Court has repeatedly found that
the questioning by an officer of an individual does not require
Fourth Amendment scrutiny as long as the officer does not make a
"show of authority." Writing for the majority in LN.S. v. Delgado,47
Justice Rehnquist further explained that in a consensual encounter,
an individual has the right to refuse to answer questions, but the
lack of knowledge of this right does not convert the encounter into a
seizure:
While most citizens will respond to a police request, the fact that peo-
ple do so, and do so without being told they are free not to respond,
hardly eliminates the consensual nature of the response. Unless the
circumstances of the encounter are so intimidating as to demonstrate
that a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave
if he had not responded, one cannot say that the questioning resulted
in a detention under the Fourth Amendment. But if the persons re-
fuses to answer and the police take additional steps . . . to obtain an
answer, then the Fourth Amendment imposes some minimal level of
objective justification to validate the detention or seizure.48
A case in point is Florida v. Rodriguez.49 The Court held that the
initial contact between three plain clothes officers and Rodriguez in
the Miami Airport terminal was a consensual encounter and not a
seizure. 50 On the airport terminal's concourse, the officers had
asked Rodriguez if he would step aside and talk with them.5 1
In applying the "free to leave" test, the Court in Delgado de-
clared that the test is not applicable to certain circumstances. The
Justice Powell distinguished this case from Mendenhall, emphasizing the size and condi-
tion of the room that Royer was taken to, and the fact that Royer's license was retained
and that Royer's luggage had already been obtained. Id. at 508 (Powell, J., concurring).
Justice Powell, however, indicated that in both Royer's case and Mendenhall the initial
questioning and the request to accompany the officers to a more private place was law-
ful. Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
In dissent, Justice Blackmun found that since the officers had sufficient suspicion to
initially detain Royer, under Teny, Royer's consent to accompany the officers to the
room and his consent to the search of his luggage was voluntary. Id. at 516-19 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun reasoned that the plurality had erred by not bal-
ancing the nature and the degree of the intrusion against the government's interest in
having more flexibility and the facts supporting the detention. Id. at 518 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist also dissented and was joined by ChiefJustice Burger and Justice
O'Connor. Justice Rehnquist found that the officers had not acted unreasonably during
or after the initial conversation with Royer on the concourse. Id. at 526 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
47 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
48 Id. at 216-17 (cites omitted).
49 469 U.S. 1 (1984).
50 Id. at 4-6.
51 Id. at 4.
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majority held that an entire factory is not seized when law enforce-
ment officials are posted at the factory exits during the questioning
of the workers by other officers.52 Justice Rehnquist reasoned that
the workers' freedom to leave or to move about the factory had al-
ready been voluntarily and significantly restricted in view of their
obligation to their employer to work. 53
More recently, the Court has used the test to determine when
investigatory pursuit or surveillance becomes a seizure. In Michigan
52 Delgado, 466 U.S. at 219.
53 Id. at 218. In Delgado, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) agents con-
ducted three different surveys of a factory to determine which employees were illegal
aliens. Id. at 212. The first two surveys were conducted pursuant to search warrants and
the last survey was conducted with the employer's consent. Id. During the surveys, INS
agents were positioned at all the factory's exits while other agents questioned employees
at their work stations or in other areas of the factory. Id. The agents were armed, dis-
played badges and carried walkie-talkies. Id. After identifying themselves as immigra-
tion agents, the agents asked the employees questions regarding their citizenship. Id.
Only when an employee responded unsatisfactorily or admitted that he was not a United
States citizen did the agents ask for immigration papers to determine whether he/she
was an illegal alien. Id. at 212-13.
The majority held that the INS's tactics did not represent a seizure of the entire
factory. Id. at 219. In addition, the majority held that the individual questioning of the
respondents by the agents was only a mere consensual encounter that did not invite
Fourth Amendment questions. Id. at 221. However, the majority also suggested that
the questioning of individuals other than the respondent may have been a seizure within
the Fourth Amendment. Said the Court: "While persons who attempted to flee or evade
the agents may eventually have been detained for questioning, respondents did not do
so and were not in fact detained." Id. at 220 (cites omitted).
In concurrence, Justice Powell stated that the question of the individual seizure was
a close one, even if seizure was found to be reasonable. Id. at 221 (Powell, J., concur-
ring). Justice Powell cited the reasoning in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543, 546, 556 (1976) (the court held that check point stops instituted to apprehend
illegal aliens are seizures within the Fourth Amendment, but government interest in
illegal alien control is great and the intrusion to the individual is minimal), to support
his conclusion. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 221 (Powell, J., concurring).
Justice Brennanjoined by Justice Marshall, concurred in part and dissented in part.
Justice Brennan disagreed with the majority and found that the respondents had been
unreasonably seized when the INS agents questioned them individually. Id. at 225-26
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Brennan said that the
majority erred because it treated the questioning like it was only an isolated one-on-one
encounter, instead of considering all of the surrounding circumstances. Id. at 229-30
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The survey was a surprise and
created a significant disruption in the work environment. Id. at 230. (Brennan, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part). While agents guarded the exits, other agents
flashed their badges and directed pointed questions at the workers. Id. (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). After the questioning, those workers who
were suspected of being illegal aliens were handcuffed and taken to vans that were lo-
cated outside the factory. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Such circumstances certainly created a highly coercive environment in which no reason-
able person would feel free to disregard the agents and walk away. Id. (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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v. Chesternut,54 a unanimous Court concluded that simply driving a
police vehicle parallel to a running pedestrian was not "so intimidat-
ing" that a reasonable person would not feel "free to disregard the
police presence and go about his business." 55 The Court rejected
both the petitioner's and the respondent's arguments for a "bright
line" rule approach. 56 Instead, the Court adhered to the contextual
approach of the "free to leave" test, requiring the court to take into
account "all the circumstances surrounding the incident" in each
individual case. 57
The ["free to leave"] test is necessarily imprecise, because it is
designed to assess the coercive effect of police conduct, taken as a
whole, rather than to focus on particular details of that conduct in iso-
lation. Moreover, what constitutes a restraint on liberty prompting a
person to conclude that he is not free to "leave" will vary, not only
with the particular police conduct at issue, but also with the setting in
which the conduct occurs. 58
According to Chesternut, the "free to leave" test provides the
courts with flexibility to judge a "whole range of police conduct in
an equally broad range of settings." 59 Yet the Court further ob-
served that the test "calls for consistent application from one police
encounter to the next, regardless of the particular individual's re-
sponse to the actions of the police." 60 The reasonable man in the
test is an objective standard that serves two purposes. 61 First, the
standard "allows the police to determine in advance whether the
54 486 U.S. 567 (1988).
55 Id. at 576. In Chesternut, the respondent started to run when he saw a patrol car
approach. Id. at 569. The police accelerated to catch up with him, and as they drove
along side of him, respondent discarded some pills. Id. The Court concluded that the
respondent was not seized by the police before he discarded the pills. Id. at 574. The
Court reasoned that "a police car driving parallel to a running pedestrian could be
somewhat intimidating," but did not amount to seizure. The Court noted that the of-
ficers did not activate the siren, command the respondent to stop, display their weapons
or block the respondents path. Id. at 575.
56 Id. at 572. Regarding investigative pursuit, the Court rejected the petitioner's
argument "that the Fourth Amendment is never implicated until an individual stops in
response to the police's show of authority." Id. In other words, the "lack of objective
and particularized suspicion" should not prevent an officer from using coercive tactics,
unless the officer "succeed[s] in actually apprehending the individual." Id.
The Court also rejected the respondent's converse argument "that any and all po-
lice 'chases' are Fourth Amendment seizures." Id. Thus, "the police may never pursue
an individual absent a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that he is en-
gaged in criminal activity." Id.
57 Id. at 572-73.
58 Id. at 573.





conduct contemplated will implicate the Fourth Amendment. '62
Second, the standard "ensures that the scope of Fourth Amendment
protection does not vary with the state of mind of the particular in-
dividual being approached." 63
Two investigative pursuit cases since Chesternut have added
more precision to the Mendenhall-Royer test. First, in Brower v. County
of Inyo, 64 writing for the majority, Justice Scalia stated that "a Fourth
Amendment seizure does not occur whenever there is a governmen-
tally caused termination of an individual's freedom of movement...
nor even whenever there is a governmentally caused and govern-
mentally desired termination ... but only when there is a govern-
mental termination of freedom of movement through means
intentionally applied." 65 Second, in California v. Hodari,66 Justice
Scalia, again writing for the majority, found that an affirmative an-
swer to the Mendenhall-Royer test is not dispositive, if the person fails
to submit to the show of authority. 67
In sum, in order to justify the arrest of an individual, under the
Fourth Amendment, a police officer must have probable cause that
the individual committed a crime. For those situations that fall
short of an arrest but amount to a detention within the Fourth
Amendment, the Terry doctrine requires: (1) the police officer to
have reasonable suspicion that the individual is or was involved in
criminal activity, and (2) the scope of the search and seizure to be
reasonable under the circumstances. Finally, absent probable cause
or reasonable suspicion, under Mendenhall-Royer, an encounter be-
tween a police officer and an individual is not a seizure, as long as
the individual feels free to break off the encounter and walk away.
Hence no Fourth Amendment scrutiny is required.
III. SUMMARY OF FACTS
Broward County, Florida has a drug interdiction program
designed to stop drug trafficking via buses, trains, or airplanes. 68
For buses, the program requires officers from the County Sheriff's
Department to routinely board intrastate or interstate buses at
scheduled stopovers to randomly, or with a minimal suspicion of
criminal activity, ask individuals for permission to search their
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 489 U.S. 593 (1989).
65 Id. at 596-97.
66 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991).
67 Id. at 1550-51.




On the morning of August 27, 1985, two officers from the
Broward County Sheriff's Department boarded a Greyhound Bus
bound from Miami to Atlanta while it was temporarily stopped at
the Fort Lauderdale terminal.70 The plainclothes officers wore jack-
ets with insignia identifying them as law enforcement officials, and
one held "a recognizable zipper pouch, containing a pistol .... ,71
Upon boarding, the officers had no articulable suspicion that any
passenger was engaging in drug trafficking. 72 Nevertheless, the of-
ficers randomly selected Terrance Bostick for questioning. 73 The of-
ficers asked to see Bostick's identification and bus ticket.74 The
information on the identification and ticket matched, and the of-
ficers returned them to Bostick without comment. 7 5 After identify-
ing themselves as narcotics agents, the officers further inquired
whether he would consent to having his luggage searched for
drugs. 7 6 According to the officers, Bostick consented to their search
request.77 In the course of their search, the officers found cocaine in
the second bag that they searched.78 Bostick was arrested and
charged with trafficking in cocaine. 7 9 Bostick thereafter moved to
suppress the cocaine on the grounds that it had been seized in viola-
tion of his Fourth Amendment rights.8 0
69 Id.
70 Id. Brief of Respondent at 1, Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991) (No. 89-
1717) [hereinafter Brief of Respondent]; Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 1, Florida v.
Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991) (No. 89-1717) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief].
71 Bostick, 11 S. Ct. at 2384; Brief of Respondent, supra note 70, at 1; Petitioner's
Brief, supra note 70, at 1.
72 Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2384-85.




77 Id. There was some dispute as to whether Bostick consented to the search of the
second bag, but the Court followed the Florida Supreme Court ruling that "any conflict
must be resolved in favor of the state, it being a question of fact decided by the trial
judge." Id. It should be noted that the trial court's order denying motion to suppress,
August 4, 1986, stated no finding of fact. SeeJoint Appendix atJA-2, Florida v. Bostick,
I11 S. Ct. 2382 (1991) (No. 89-1717). At the suppression hearing, Bostick testified that
the officers only asked for consent to search the first bag, which was red. Id. atJA-3,JA-
43-45. On the other hand, both officers testified that after the search of the red bag was
completed, Bostick was asked to consent to the search of the second bag, which was
blue. Id. atJA-10,JA-23.






The trial court denied Bostick's motion to suppress the co-
caine.8' On appeal, the Florida Appellate Court affirmed the trial
court's ruling but certified the following question to the Florida
Supreme Court: "May the police without articulable suspicion board
a bus and ask at random, for, and receive, consent to search a pas-
senger's luggage where they advise the passenger that he has the
right to refuse consent to search?"8 2 Before answering the certified
question, the Florida Supreme Court amended it to read: "Does an
impermissible seizure result when police mount a drug search on
buses during scheduled stops and question boarded passengers
without articulable reasons for doing so, thereby obtaining consent
to search the passengers' luggage?"83 The court answered the certi-
fied question in the affirmative 4 and found that, under the circum-
stances, Bostick was unreasonably "seized", within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, when the
officers approached him on the bus.8 5 The court based its finding
that Bostick had been unreasonably seized on three factors. First, a
reasonable person would not have felt "free to leave" or "free to
disregard the questions and walk away" because both of the officers
wore raid jackets, one of them appeared to be holding a weapon and
the other partially blocked the bus aisle during questioning. 6 Sec-
ond, the bus was about to depart soon, so Bostick could not leave,
and "[h]e had only the confines of the bus itself in which to move
about, had he felt the officers would let him do so."87 Third, the
state conceded that there was no articulable suspicion that Bostick
was engaging in illegal activity.88
The court further concluded that the consent was involuntary
because there was no definitive break in the illegal environment al-
ready created by the seizure.8 9 Thus, any consent Bostick gave to
search his luggage was tainted by the unreasonable seizure and must
be suppressed. 90
81 Id. Bostick pleaded guilty to the drug trafficking charge, "but reserved the right to
appeal the denial of the motion to suppress." Id. "
82 Bostick v. State, 510 So. 2d 321, 322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (per curiam).
83 Bostick v. State, 554 So. 2d 1153, 1154 (Fla. 1989).
84 Id.
85 Id. at 1157-59. See supra text accompanying note 9 for the language of the Fourth
Amendment.
86 Bostick, 554 So. 2d at 1157.
87 Id.





Finally, the court found that (under the circumstances) the gov-
ernment had "exceeded its power to interfere with the privacy of an
individual citizen who is not even suspected of any criminal wrong-
doing."9 1 The court reasoned that the Broward County policy inter-
fered too greatly with individual privacy rights. The fight against
drug trafficking could not justify such intrusions because that would
only lead to an authoritarian state.92
The court, therefore, quashed the opinion of the appellate
court and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent
with the supreme court's opinion.93
The state of Florida petitioned for certiorari on the grounds
that the Florida Supreme Court's decision conflicted with the con-
trolling case law from the United States Supreme Court and also
conflicted with federal courts of appeals decisions, e.g., the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, as well as state courts of appeals
decisions, e.g., the North Carolina Court of Appeals. 94 Certiorari
was granted by the Court.95
V. THE SUPREME COURT OPINION
A. MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for the majority, 96 justice O'Connor, reversed the Flor-
ida Supreme Court's decision and remanded the case for further
proceedings using the correct legal standard.97 The majority held
that "in order to determine whether a particular encounter consti-
tutes a seizure, a court must consider all the circumstances sur-
rounding the encounter to determine whether the police conduct
would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person
was not free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate
the encounter.198 This test applies equally to police encounters on
streets, in an airport lobby or on a bus.99
Justice O'Connor characterized the Florida Supreme Court's
decision as "a per se rule that the Broward County Sheriff's practice
91 Id.
92 Id. at 1158-59.
93 Id. at 1159.
94 Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Florida Supreme Court at 10-12, Florida v.
Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991) (No. 89-1717).
95 Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2385 (1991).
96 Justice O'Connor was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White,
Scalia, Kennedy and Souter.
97 Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2388-89.




of 'working the buses' is unconstitutional,"'' 0 0 and concluded that
the Florida Supreme Court erred because its decision was based on
whether Bostick felt "free to leave" the bus, rather than on whether
he felt free to "decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate
the encounter."' 1 Justice O'Connor determined that Bostick volun-
tarily boarded the bus and did not intend to leave, since the bus was
about to depart. Thus, even if the officers had not approached him,
Bostick would not have felt "free to leave."'10 2
Justice O'Connor stated that the controlling law in this case
flows from Justice Warren's dicta in Terry' 0 3 stating that,
"'[o]bviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen and
citizens involves 'seizures' of persons. Only when the officer, by
means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way re-
strained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has
occurred.'-104 Seizure does not occur when an individual is ap-
proached by a police officer, unless the individual does not "feel
free 'to disregard the police and go about his business.' "105 A po-
lice officer is free to approach an individual and ask if he or she
would be "willing to answer some questions."106 Justice O'Connor
noted that if the police had encountered Bostick on the street or in
the bus terminal, the case law shows that there would be no
seizure.' 07 In other cases similar to Bostick's, the Court has said that
it is not necessary that the police have reason to suspect the individ-
ual before they ask him or her questions, "as long as the police do
not convey a message that compliance with their requests is
required."108
The majority argued that the "free to leave" test was an inap-
propriate measure for encounters that take place on a bus.10 9
When police attempt to question a person who is walking down the
street or through an airport lobby, it makes sense to inquire whether a
reasonable person would feel free to continue walking. But when the
100 Id. at 2385.
101 Id. at 2389.
102 Id. at 2387.
103 See supra text accompanying notes 18-29 for a discussion of Terry.
104 Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2386 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)).
105 Id. (quoting California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1551 (1991)).
106 Id (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983) (plurality opinion) (police
encounter in an airport terminal)).
107 Id. In support of this contention, Justice O'Connor cited to Florida v. Rodriguez,
469 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1984) (police encounter in a airport terminal).
108 Id. at 2386 (citing INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984) (INS agent encounter
in a factory); United States v. Mendenhall, 466 U.S. 544, 557-58 (1980) (DEA agent
encounter in a airport terminal)).
109 Id., at 2387.
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person is seated on a bus and has no desire to leave, the degree to
which a reasonable person would feel that he or she could leave is not
an accurate measure of the coercive effect of the encounter."10
In other words, the police did not confine Bostick, rather he placed
himself in confinement when he initially boarded the bus. 1
In support of its argument, the majority drew an analogy to
I.N.S. v.Delgado.1 12 In Delgado, the Court held that random visits to
factories by INS agents to question workers about their citizenship
did not constitute a seizure, even though INS agents were posted at
the factory exits.' '3 The Court stated that the workers had an obli-
gation to their employer to remain at work, so they were not free to
leave regardless of the agents' presence. 14 Thus, the Bostick major-
ity declared that the true test in situations like Bostick's and the one
in Delgado is whether, considering all of the circumstances, "a rea-
sonable person would [have felt] free to decline the officers' re-
quests or otherwise terminate the encounter." 1 5 The majority
reasoned that, "[like the workers in [Delgado], Bostick's freedom of
movement was restricted by a factor independent of police con-
duct-i.e., by his being a passenger on a bus." ' 1 6 Additionally, the
majority emphasized that refusals to cooperate with the officers
would not be considered justification for the officers to detain or
seize the individual.' "7
Upon announcing its decision, the majority declined to rule on
whether Bostick felt free not to respond to the officers' inquiries
because the "trial court made no express findings of fact," and in
the majority's view, the Florida Supreme Court based its decision on
the sole fact that the encounter took place on a bus, "rather than on
the totality of the circumstances." 18 But in dictum the majority sug-
gested that a seizure probably had not occurred, since "the officers
did not point guns at Bostick or otherwise threaten him and that
they specifically advised Bostick that he could refuse consent."'" 19
Accordingly, the Court remanded the case to the Florida courts for
110 Id.
HI Id.
112 466 U.S. 210 (1984). See supra note 53 and accompanying text for a more detailed
discussion of Delgado.
113 Delgado, 466 U.S. at 221.
114 Id. at 218.
115 Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2387 (1991).
116 Id.
117 Id. The majority also noted that there is no merit to the argument that a reason-
able person would not "freely consent to a search of luggage that he or she knows con-
tains drugs." Id. at 2388.
118 Id. at 2388.
SIs) Id. at 2387-88.
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further proceedings using the proper legal standard.1 20
B. JUSTICE MARSHALL'S DISSENTING OPINION
In dissent, Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Blackmun and
Stevens, disagreed with the majority's overall characterization of the
Florida's Supreme Court's decision. 121 Specifically, the dissent ar-
gued that the majority erred in concluding that the Florida Supreme
Court announced a per se rule independent of the facts. 122 The Flor-
ida Supreme Court "repeatedly emphasized that its conclusion was
based on 'all the circumstances' of this case."'123 The dissent further
declared that "the issue whether a seizure has occurred in any given
factual setting is a question of law [and as such] nothing prevents
this Court from deciding on its own whether a seizure occurred
based on all of the facts of this case as they appear in the opinion of
the Florida Supreme Court." 124
The majority and dissent agreed that the appropriate test in this
case "is whether a passenger who is approached during such a
sweep 'would feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise
terminate the encounter.' "125 Unlike the majority, however, the dis-
sent concluded that based on the facts, the police officer's conduct
towards Bostick was coercive and constituted an "intimidating show
of authority," resulting in Bostick not feeling free to terminate the
encounter. 126 After highlighting the fact that the officers never ad-
vised Bostick that he could refuse to answer their questions, 127 the
dissent argued that the majority erred because its decision was
120 Id. at 2388.
121 Id. at 2391-92 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall compared the intrusive
nature of suspicionless police sweep of buses in intrastate or interstate travel to the
general warrant that the Fourth Amendment was originally designed to protect against.
Id. at 2389 (Marshall J., dissenting). He noted that sweeps are intrusive and inconve-
nient to passengers, delay departure of the bus, and that the success rate of sweeps is
low, e.g., in one case sweeps of 100 buses only resulted in seven arrests. Id. at 2390
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
122 Id. at 2391-92 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
123 Id. at 2392 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
124 Id. (Marshall,J., dissenting). The majority rebutted the dissent's argument that the
Florida Supreme Court did not rule per se citing a series of cases in which the Florida
Supreme Court quashed denials of motion to suppress based on its affirmative answer to
the certified question considered in this case. Id. at 2385 n.**. See, e.g., McBride v.
State, 554 So. 2d 1160 (1989); Mendez v. State, 554 So. 2d 1161 (1989); Shaw v. State,
555 So. 2d 351 (1989); Avery v. State, 555 So. 2d 351 (1989); Serpa v. State, 555 So. 2d
1210 (1989); Jones v. State, 559 So. 2d 1096 (1990).
125 Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2391 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
126 Id. at 2392-93 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
127 Id. at 2392 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1992]
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
based on the officers' asking consent to search Bostick's luggage. 128
The dissent reasoned that it did not matter that the officers asked
for consent to search the luggage because they had already seized
Bostick, making his consent unlawful.' 29 "Consequently, the issue is
not whether a passenger in respondent's position would have felt
free to deny consent to the search of his bag, but whether such a
passenger-without being apprised of his rights-would have felt
free to terminate the antecedent encounter with the police."' 30
The dissent argued that Bostick would not have felt free to
break off the initial encounter with the police, i.e., he would not
have felt free to refuse the officers request to see his identification
and bus ticket.13 ' Since the typical passenger does not know that the
police can not use his refusal to cooperate against him, the major-
ity's argument that a passenger's refusal to answer a question does
not give rise to seizure becomes a moot point.'3 2 Furthermore, the
dissent asserted that a passenger cannot be expected to try to
squeeze by a "gun-wielding inquisitor," and even if a passenger
thought he could get by the officers, he would have been deterred
by the possibility of being stranded if he left the bus. 13
Although the majority compared Bostick to Delgado, the dissent
asserted that the cases are easily distinguished. 3 4 "Unlike passen-
gers confronted by law-enforcement officials on a bus stopped tem-
porarily at an intermediate point in its journey, workers approached
by law-enforcement officials at their work need not abandon per-
sonal belongings and venture into unfamiliar environs in order to
avoid unwanted questioning." 3 5 In criticizing the majority's reason-
ing, the dissent stated that, "a person's 'voluntary decision' to place
128 Id. at 2392-93 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
129 Id. at 2393 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall noted that "the State con-
cedes, and as the majority purports to 'accept,' if respondent was unlawfully seized when
the officers approached him and initiated questioning, the resulting search was likewise
unlawful no matter how well advised respondent was of his right to refuse it." Id. (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting) (cites omitted).
The majority refuted the dissent's argument that it based it decision on voluntary
consent that was actually compelled by an intimidating show of authority. Id. at 2388.
The majority stated that its holding did not condone officers boarding buses and using
coercive tactics to obtain consent from passengers to conduct a search. Id. The consent
must be voluntary and not a "product of official intimidation or harassment .... " Id.
The majority stated that on remand the Florida courts are to decide "whether Bostick
chose to permit the search of his luggage." Id.
130 Id. at 2393 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
131 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
132 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
'33 Id. at 2394 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
134 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
135 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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himself in a room with only one exit does not authorize the police to
force an encounter upon him by placing themselves in front of the
exit."13 6
The dissent noted that "[u]nlike a person approached by the
police on the street, or at a bus or airport terminal after reaching his
destination, a passenger approached by the police at an intermedi-
ate point in a long bus journey cannot simply leave the scene and
repair to a safe haven to avoid unwanted probing by law-enforce-
ment officials." 137
In conclusion, the dissent said that the "Fourth Amendment
clearly condemns the suspicionless, dragnet-style sweep of intra-
state or interstate buses."' 38 The police, however, would remain
free to conduct questioning of individuals when there is reasonable
suspicion. 139 Alternatively, suspicionless questioning could be done
as long as some guidelines are set, "like advising the passengers
confronted of their right to decline to be questioned, to dispel the
aura of coercion and intimidation that pervades such
encounters." 140
VI. ANALYSIS
In Bostick, the majority stated that the Florida Court erred in
"focusing on whether Bostick was 'free to leave ' 14 1 rather than on
136 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
137 Id. at 2393 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The majority refuted the dissent's argument
that the majority's decision would discriminate against those individuals that choose to
travel by bus, instead of other modes of transportation. Id. at 2388. The majority stated
that it was the dissent that wishes to discriminate in favor of bus passengers, because the
test to determine whether a reasonable person freely consented "applies equally to po-
lice encounters that take place on trains, planes, and city streets." Id.
138 Id. at 2394 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The majority stated that its decision follows
logically from the case law and cites Terry, Royer, Rodriguez, and Delgado to dispel the
dissent's concern that officers, without reasonable suspicion, would be asking bus pas-
sengers potentially incriminating questions. Id. at 2388. The cases the majority referred
to all endorsed the proposition that mere questioning by an officer does not require
Fourth Amendment scrutiny. See Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1984); I.N.S. v.
Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501 (1983) (plurality
opinion); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968).
The majority also realized that constitutional guarantees should not be suspended
in order to help the Government wage a "war on drugs." Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2389.
However, the majority did not agree that these guarantees would be suspended by not
allowing the cramped confines of a bus to be the dispositive factor in every case because
there are other factors that should be equally considered. Id.
139 Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2394 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
140 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).




the principle that those words were intended to capture."' 42 The
majority concluded that the Florida Supreme Court erred in finding
a seizure because its decision was based solely on the fact that the
encounter between Bostick and the police took place on a bus, in-
stead of considering the totality of the circumstances.' 43 It is ques-
tionable, however, whether the Florida Supreme Court ruled per se
that all police encounters on a bus constitute a seizure of the per-
son. As the dissent points out, the Florida Supreme Court seemed
to base its decision on all of the circumstances in this case, rather
than on the sole fact that the encounter took place on a bus. 144 In
particular, the Florida Supreme Court stated that "[t]he crucial
question is whether, under all the circumstances, a reasonable person
would have believed he was not free to leave."' 45 Nevertheless, for
the purpose of this analysis, this note concedes, arguendo, that the
Florida court ruled per se.
This note concludes that neither the Florida Supreme Court's
per se rule nor the majority's variation of the Mendenhall-Royer test is
appropriate for determining when an encounter on a bus becomes a
seizure. Rather, a better test would consider the objective purpose
for which an officer initially approaches an individual. This note
agrees that the majority's rule is consistent with current case law.
However, this case law relies on a reasonable person standard that
does not represent reality, since the average person would not as-
sert himself when questioned by the police. By suggesting in dictum
that the nature of the encounter in this case probably does not con-
stitute a finding of seizure, 146 the majority continues the develop-
ment of the artificial reasonable person. As a result of the majority's
failure to appreciate the facts or of the majority's cloaked judicial
activism, the Bostick decision promotes unbridled police discretion
and may result in major social consequences.
A. EVALUATION OF THE MAJORITY'S RULE
1. The Bostick Rule is Consistent with Current Case Law
The majority characterizes dragnet styled bus sweeps as con-
sensual encounters involving mere questioning of the passenger by
the police, given that there is no intimidating show of authority by
the officers. 147 The majority supports its conclusion by formulating
142 Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2387.
143 Id. at 2388.
144 Id. at 2391-92 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
145 Bostick v. State, 554 So. 2d 1153, 1157 (Fla. 1989) (emphasis added).
146 Bostick, I I 1 S. Ct. at 2388.
147 Id. at 2386, 2388.
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a variation of the Mendenhall-Royer "free to leave" test, namely,
"whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers'
requests or otherwise terminate the encounter."' 48 According to
Justice O'Connor, "[t]his formulation follows logically from prior
cases and breaks no new ground."'149 Indeed, the approach in Bostick
is consistent with Chesternut where the Court expressly refused to
adopt a per se or "bright line" rule to determine when a seizure oc-
curs in investigative pursuit cases.'5 0 In particular, the majority's
rule continues the traditional contextual approach of considering all
of the circumstances, rather than calling all police encounters on a
bus a seizure of the person. This also comports with the proposi-
tion endorsed in Royer that Fourth Amendment rights are not impli-
cated when the police simply pose questions to a willing listener.' 5 '
Furthermore, it can properly be inferred from Justice Rehn-
quist's reasoning in Delgado that the term "free to leave" in the Men-
denhall-Royer test should not be read literally when the person is
already restricted from leaving the area by something or someone
other than the police. 5 2 Similar reasoning was also employed in the
Brower investigative pursuit case. In dicta, Justice Scalia asserted
that the restraint on the individual's freedom must be a result of the
government's intentionally applied means. 153 Justice Scalia qualified
his statement by noting that it was not practical to look at the spe-
cific subjective intent of the officer; hence, one should only look to
see whether the means caused a restraint and not whether the
means caused the exact type of restraint that the officer intended. 54
Finally, the Court in Bostick is simply adjusting the Mendenhall-
Royer rule so that the wording is applicable to situations other than
the typical encounter between an officer and a pedestrian on the
street or in a transportation terminal. Similarly, the Court in Ches-
ternut made an adjustment for the investigative pursuit cases,
namely, whether a reasonable person was "free to disregard the po-
148 Id. at 2387.
149 Id.
150 See supra text accompanying notes 54-58.
151 See supra text accompanying notes 41-44.
152 See supra text accompanying notes 52-53.
153 Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1989).
154 Id. at 598. Justice Scalia explained:
In determining whether the means that terminates the freedom of movement is the
very means that the government intended we cannot draw too fine a line, or we will
be driven to saying that one is not seized who has been stopped by the accidental
discharge of a gun with which he was meant only to be bludgeoned, or by a bullet in
the heart that was meant only for the leg. We think it enough for a seizure that a
person be stopped by the very instrumentality set in motion or put in place in order




lice presence and go about his business." 155 Accordingly, Justice
O'Connor is correct that the rule pronounced in Bostick breaks no
new ground.
2. The Foundation Underlying The Bostick Rule is Only a Legal Fiction
Logically following case law does not necessarily make a rule
the right one, especially if the Court has had difficulty applying the
original rule from its inception and has on occasion manipulated the
rule to achieve a desired outcome. A number of commentators have
criticized the Mendenhall-Royer test because, contrary to the intent of
the test explained in Chesternut,156 the test does not provide objectiv-
ity and consistency in determining exactly when a seizure occurs. 157
A primary criticism is that the Court has constructed a highly artifi-
cial reasonable person who would assert himself in most police en-
counters, even though the average citizen would not.158
Commentators have noted that "in virtually every police-citizen en-
counter the average citizen does not feel free to walk away."' 15 9 The
application of this artificial reasonable person has resulted in similar
cases being decided differently based on "minute factual
differences." 160
A brief comparison of the facts and holdings in Mendenhal1161
and Royer 1 6 2 supports this point. The encounter in both cases took
place on an airport terminal concourse. In each case more than one
officer was involved, and a drug courier profile was used to select
the individual for questioning. In addition, in each case when it was
discovered that the individual used different names on his or her
155 Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 576 (1988).
156 See supra text accompanying notes 58-63.
157 See Edwin J. Butterfoss, Bright Line Seizures: The Need for Clarity in Determining When
Fourth Amendment Activity Begins, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 437, 440 (1988); Rachel
A. Van Cleave, Note, Michigan v. Chesternut and Investigative Pursuits: Is There No End to the
War Between the Constitution and Common Sense?, 40 HASTINGS LJ. 203, 213 (1988).
158 Butterfoss, supra note 157, at 439-40.
159 See id at 463; 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 9.2(h), at 410-11 (2d ed.
1987) (" 'Implicit in the introduction of the [officer] and the initial questioning is a show
of authority to which the average person encountered will feel obliged to stop and re-
spond. Few will feel that they can walk away or refuse to answer.' "); Marjorie E. Mur-
phy, Encounters of a Brief Kind: On Arbitrariness and Police Demands for Identification, 1986
ARIZ. ST. LJ. 207, 215 (1986) ("Few people 'will ever feel free not to cooperate fully
with the police by answering their questions.' "); see also Emily J. Sack, Note, Police Ap-
proaches and Inquiries on the Streets of New York: The Aftermath of People v. DeBour, 66 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 512, 517 (1991); Van Cleave, supra note 157, at 212-14.
160 Butterfoss, supra note 157, at 440; see Van Cleave, supra note 157, at 213.
161 See supra note 31 and accompanying text for a complete discussion of the facts and
holding in Mendenhall.
162 See supra text accompanying notes 44-45, and notes 43, 46 and accompanying text
for a complete discussion of the facts and holding in Royer.
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identification and ticket, the officers asked the individual to accom-
pany them to a room for more questioning. At this point, the cases
differ slightly: in Royer the officers retained his ticket and identifica-
tion; whereas, in Mendenhall the officers returned her ticket and
identification before proceeding to the room for further question-
ing. Another distinction in the cases is the size of the interrogation
room. In Royer the room was a "large storage closet" with a small
desk and a couple chairs. In Mendenhall the room was part of a three
room office that was connected by a reception area. A majority of
the Court in Royer concluded on these facts that Royer had been
seized. 163 In contrast, a two person plurality in Mendenhall con-
cluded that Mendenhall had not been seized, 164 and three concur-
ring justices found the question of seizure to be an extremely close
one.165
The number and strength of dissents and concurrences in Men-
denhall16 6 and Royer 167 further demonstrates how arbitrary the appli-
cation of the Mendenhall-Royer rule can be. For instance, in Royer, the
plurality found a seizure based on the totality of the circumstances,
but seemed to focus primarily on the single fact that the officers re-
tained Royer's license and airline ticket.168 In separate opinions,
the two concurring judges found a seizure of the person at points
different from the plurality-Justice Brennan found that a seizure
occurred when the officers initially asked Royer for identification; 169
whereas, Justice Powell found that a seizure occurred only after the
officers had taken Royer to the room for questioning. 70 There was
even disagreement amongst the four dissenting justices. In dissent,
Justice Blackmun agreed that a seizure had occurred, but neglected
to say at which point during the encounter. 171 In contrast, the three
other dissenting justices found that no seizure had occurred at any-
time during the encounter.17 2
Another example of the arbitrariness of the application of the
Mendenhall-Royer rule is the Court's conclusion in Chesternut that driv-
ing a patrol car parallel to a running pedestrian is intimidating but
163 See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 508-09 (1983).
164 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.).
165 M41 at 560 n. 1 (Powell, J. concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
166 See supra note 31 and accompanying text for discussion of the concurrences and
dissents in Mendenhall.
167 See supra note 46 and accompanying text for discussion of the concurrences and
dissents in Royer.
168 See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501-02 (1983).
169 Id. at 511 (Brennan, J., concurring in the result).
170 Id. at 508 (Powell, J., concurring).
171 Id. at 516-19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
172 Id. at 526 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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not in itself a sufficient "show of authority" to constitute a
seizure. 173 The Court indicated that the siren needed to be turned
on or some other action needed to be taken by the police before it
would conclude that there was a seizure. 174 Nevertheless, the Court
ignored the fact that the pedestrian had started to run at the sight of
the patrol car and the officers had accelerated to catch up with him,
even though the officers had no reasonable suspicion that he was
involved in criminal activity. 175 An application of the "free to leave"
test at this antecedent event would lead one to conclude that the
pedestrian was exercising his right to disregard the police. The
Court's analysis in Chesternut indicates that isolated facts are more
important than the totality of circumstances.
Likewise, in Delgado, after determining that the entire factory
was not seized, the Court failed to consider the one-on-one en-
counters with respect to the totality of the circumstances. 76 The
surrounding atmosphere was quite coercive, since the surveys in-
volved many agents who displayed badges, carried walkie-talkies
and weapons, 177 and chased down those workers who tried to
hide.' 78 Nevertheless, the majority ignored these facts and focused
on the nature of the questioning of the individual worker at his work
station. The majority maintained that the worker could always ig-
nore the questions and continue to work. 179 However, how likely is
it that a reasonable person in this situation would feel he could dis-
regard the agent's questions and continue to work without suffering
some consequences? The majority also suggested that if the worker
had attempted to avoid the agents and failed, then there probably
would have been a seizure. 180 This assertion by the majority again
supports the conclusion that the Court is primarily looking for obvi-
ous signs of coercion.
The Mendenhall-Royer rule has also been manipulated to make it
more difficult to find that a seizure has occurred. In Hodari,181 Jus-
tice Scalia relegated the "free to leave" test to being only the first of
two elements that must be satisfied in order for a police encounter
to constitute a seizure. 182 The second element requires that the in-
173 Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 575 (1988).
174 Id.
175 See id. at 569.
176 I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 229-30 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
177 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
178 Id. at 220.
179 Id. at 220-21.
180 Id.
181 See supra text accompanying notes 66-67.
182 California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct 1547, 1550-52 (1991). In determining that the
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dividual must have actually submitted to the officer's show of au-
thority. 83 This second element, however, violates the objectivity
that the Chesternut Court said the "free to leave" test was supposed
to provide, because this element requires the Court to consider the
particular individual's response, rather than a reasonable person's
response. Moreover, the Hodari rule is similar to one of the "bright
line" rules that was rejected by a majority of Court in Chesternut.184
B. APPLICATION OF THE RULE IN BOSTICK
The Bostick dicta amplifies the artificiality of the reasonable per-
son because a person would have to assert himself in a confined
space with police officers standing over him. Unlike the workers in
Delgado, the encounter becomes a forced confrontation that virtually
cannot be avoided. The majority's analysis of the totality of the cir-
cumstances appears to ignore the coerciveness of the bus environ-
ment and to overestimate the assertiveness of the average citizen.
1. Does Police Conduct Always Have the Same Effect?
The majority in Bostick focuses on the conduct of the officers,
rather than the totality of the circumstances. As a result, the major-
ity fails to adhere to the Chesternut language when applying the rule.
The Court in Chesternut stated that not just the conduct of the police
but the setting in which the conduct occurs could have a restraining
effect. 185
Like the Court in Delgado, however, after ruling that a bus envi-
ronment was only a factor to consider and not dispositive on a
seizure determination, the Bostick majority conveniently ignored any
coercive affect that the environment would have on a person being
questioned. Instead, the majority examined the officers' conduct to
determine whether the officers had committed overt acts that would
constitute a seizure of a person. In dictum, the majority doubted
whether a seizure occurred because "the officers did not point guns
at Bostick or otherwise threaten him...." 186 This conclusion is not
"free to leave" test is not always dispositive, Justice Scalia focused on the term "only if"
in the Mendenhall-Royer rule: "'A person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.'" Id. at 1551
(emphasis added). Justice Scalia concluded that the test "states a necessary, but not a
sufficient condition for seizure" because the term "only if" was used rather than the
term "whenever." Id.
183 Id. at 1551.
184 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
185 Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988).
186 Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2388 (1991).
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surprising since in reality the overt acts the majority looked for are
the same overt acts that would unequivocally constitute a seizure of
the person in an airport terminal or on a street.
The majority stated that under Royer and its progeny "[there is
no doubt that if this same encounter had taken place before Bostick
boarded the bus or in the lobby of the bus terminal, it would not rise
to the level of a seizure."' 8 7 Regardless of the setting, however, it is
hard to imagine the "drug raid"jackets worn by the officers and the
gun displayed by one of the officers not amounting to an intimidat-
ing show of authority that would make a reasonable person feel re-
strained. Another fact ignored by the majority is that a bus
passenger is typically sitting during such an encounter which places
him in a subordinate role from the beginning of the encounter;
whereas, in the typical airport encounter the individual approached
is standing.
Therefore, the Bostick majority did not consider the totality of
the circumstances.
2. Do Average People Say No to Police?
Since the majority doubts that a seizure occurred in this case, it
is suggesting that a reasonable person would have felt free to assert
himself and could have refused to cooperate with the officers. The
majority's reasonable person is assertive because he knows that "a
refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal
level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure."' 88
The majority can argue, however, that knowledge of this right is ir-
relevant because "[w]hile most citizens will respond to a police re-
quest, the fact that people do so, and do so without being told they
are free not to respond, hardly eliminates the consensual nature of
the response."18 9 The natural sense of duty to cooperate with the
police is very helpful in fighting crime.
Nevertheless, the Court is supposed to make sure that the po-
lice do not take advantage of this natural sense of duty to cooperate
with the police in order to obtain additional information. The as-
sessment of whether the police used coercive tactics is to be done by
considering the totality of the circumstances.1 90 Since seizure is de-
termined as a matter of law, this assessment does not take into ac-
count the maturity and intelligence level of the individual who is
187 Id. at 2386.
188 Id. at 2387.
189 I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984).
190 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973).
822 [Vol. 82
FOURTH AMENDMENT
approached by the police. 191 In other words, an individual's knowl-
edge and self confidence is not to be considered.
The tendency of the Court, however, to not properly assess the
totality of the circumstances makes an individual's lack of knowledge
of his rights significant. And as the dissent correctly points out,
most people do not know what their rights are. 192 Therefore, under
the circumstances in this case, it is significant that the officers did
not advise Bostick of his rights before asking for his identification
and bus ticket. Up to that point, the officers did nothing to dispel
the aura of their authority and by the time they advised Bostick of
his right to refuse consent, Bostick was already effectively seized.193
There is no reason why the officers could not identify their inten-
tions to look for drugs up front and advise Bostick of his rights
before asking for information. The fact that the officers found noth-
ing wrong with Bostick's identification and still asked to search the
luggage, implies that the purpose of the identification check is not a
pre-screening to determine whose luggage should be checked.
On the contrary, the purpose of the unqualified identification
check seems to be more of a show of authority. Unlike the request
for proof of citizenship in Delgado or in the case of a traffic stop, the
request for identification in this case is outside the purpose of the
encounter. Justice Brennan, in his concurrence in Royer, noted the
difference between a police officer simply asking a person on the
street questions and a police officer asking a person at an airport
terminal to produce his/her airline ticket and driver's license.19 4
Justice Brennan stated: "By identifying themselves and asking for
Royer's airline ticket and driver's license the officers, as a practical
matter, engaged in a "show of authority" and "restrained Royer's
liberty."1 95
In brief, the majority erred in dismissing the initial encounter
between Bostick and the officers as mere questioning. The majority
neither considered the totality of the circumstances nor the signifi-
cance of the officers' not advising Bostick of his rights.
C. POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE COURT'S RULING
The majority's decision does not provide proper guidance to
the law enforcement officials conducting sweeps of buses. By sug-
gesting in dictum that no seizure had occurred, the majority is con-
191 In ReJ.M., 1991 D.C. App. Lexis 244, 16-18.
192 Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2393 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
193 Id. at 2392-93 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
194 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 511 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in result).
195 Id. at 511-12 (Brennan, J., concurring in result).
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doning unbridled police discretion. Consequently, the poor,
students and elderly, who are the primary bus passengers, will con-
tinue to be inconvenienced and traumatized by the sweeps. In con-
trast, it is doubtful that the police will conduct sweeps of first class
or business airline passengers.' 9 6
First, the typical dragnet bus sweep delays the bus, because the
officers do not depart until the sweep is complete, which frequently
takes more time than a stopover of ten or twenty minutes.' 9 7 Sec-
ond, the passengers may suffer public embarrassment if the search
of their luggage reveals something that they would prefer to keep
private. 198 Third, there is always the possibility of an armed con-
frontation, especially if a drug courier finds himself cornered. In
such an instance, all passengers are in danger. Furthermore, the
nature of the sweeps will proliferate age, gender, ethnic and racial
discrimination. Officers admit that, during routine bus sweeps, peo-
ple are sometimes selected based on gender, age and race. 199
Finally, it is evident that law enforcement does not require the
unbridled discretion that the majority gives. Subsequent to the
Florida Supreme Court decision,200 the Broward County Sheriff of-
ficers performed bus sweeps without a display of weapons and
badges, and the officers provided a clear path for the passenger
under question to leave.20 '
D. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE TO THE MENDENHALL-ROYER TEST
Justice O'Connor criticized the dissent for advocating the over-
ruling of more than twenty years of precedent starting with Terry.202
This is an incorrect assertion, however, because Justice Marshall's
position would limit only the last eleven years of precedent starting
with Mendenhall where the reasonable person was introduced. The
Terry Court made no mention of such a person in its dicta. Hence,
until a better universal test is developed, the Mendenhall-Royer test
196 Motion to File Brief and Brief Amicus Curiae of Americans for Effective Law En-
forcement, Inc., In Qualified Support of Affirmance of the Decision Below at 8, Florida
v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991) (No. 89-1717).
197 Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2390 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
198 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union... In Support of
Respondents at 6, Florida v. Bostick, I11 S. Ct. 2382 (1991) (No. 89-1717).
199 Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2390 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
200 See supra text accompany notes 83-93 for a detailed discussion of the Florida
Supreme Court decision.
201 See Brief of Respondent, supra note 70, at 21 n.21; See also United States v. Ham-
mock, 860 F.2d 390, 391-92 (11 th Cir. 1988) (the court held that a seizure had not
occurred, since officers concealed their weapons and stood slightly behind the passenger
in order to keep the aisle clear).
202 Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2388.
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should be limited to the original pedestrian setting from which it
was conceived where the natural environment is not as coercive. 203
This Note suggests that, at least with respect to bus encounters,
the Court adopt an approach suggested by Professor Butterfoss.
Professor Butterfoss set out a two-test standard that combines a
"free to leave" test with the Terry balancing test. Under this ap-
proach, the Mendenhall-Royer test is limited to police encounters
where the police approach a person to seek his cooperation on mat-
ters other than an individual's involvement in criminal activity.2 04
On the other hand, the Terry balancing test would be used when the
officer approaches an individual with the purpose of questioning
him about his involvement in criminal activity.205 Professor But-
terfoss calls this approach the "purpose of the stop" test.2 0 6
1. The "Purpose of the Stop" Test
The "purpose of the stop" test draws a "bright line" for deter-
mining when a seizure of the person has occurred. Such a rule looks
at the officer's objective intent. If his objective intent is to investi-
gate a particular individual's involvement in criminal activity, then
he needs reasonable suspicion to do so. For instance, if the officer's
specific assignment is to look for drug couriers on buses, he would
203 A pedestrian typically has freedom of movement and in most cases would be famil-
iar with the surroundings.
204 Butterfoss, supra note 157, at 470. Professor Butterfoss explained:
When a police officer approaches a citizen and asks questions as part of the officer's
"community caretaking function," to seek the citizen's cooperation, or for reasons
other than suspicion that the citizen is involved in a crime, the Fourth Amendment
will not be implicated until a seizure occurs as defined by either the Mendenhall-Royer
standard or some other standard based on what actions are appropriate in such a
situation.
Id.
205 Id. Professor Butterfoss explained that "if the officer suspects the individual ap-
proached of involvement in criminal activity, the Fourth Amendment will be implicated
immediately. Such a two-test scenario is both practical and logical." Id.
206 Professor Butterfoss further explained:
The two-test scenario is practical in part because the issue of whether a police-citi-
zen encounter with a non-suspect constitutes a seizure will not arise frequently. As
Professor LaFave points out, if the person stopped is merely a potential witness, it is
unlikely that the person "will have the occasion or desire to challenge this action
unless something incriminating that person occurs as a consequence of the
stop ....
The distinction between the two types of cases is also logical. A test based on
the purpose of the police in initiating an encounter recognizes the wholly different
character of police-suspect encounters, resulting in large part from the self-incrimi-
nation implications of those encounters. Moreover, it provides more consistent re-
sults and strikes a more appropriate balance between Fourth Amendment
protections and the need to fight crime.
Id. at 470-71 (footnotes omitted).
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need reasonable suspicion to interview passengers regarding their
involvement in drug trafficking.
"Such a standard recognizes the important distinction between
the different types of police-citizen encounters, more properly bal-
ances the competing interests of the individual and the state, and
provides a more workable standard. ' 20 7 In contrast, Mendenhall-
Royer treats "identically individuals whom police approach for the
purpose of discovering whether that individual is involved in crimi-
nal activity and individuals to whom police desire to speak for other,
innocuous reasons."208 Mendenhall-Royer as a universal test is unsatis-
factory, however, because it fails to consider a person's Fifth
Amendment 20 9 rights which are implicated when the officer is inves-
tigating to determined whether that person is involved in criminal
activity.2 10 Using the artificial reasonable person standard that the
Mendenhall-Royer is based on, the Court may take advantage of self
incriminating evidence obtained through the inherent coerciveness
of a police-citizen encounter.211
2. Application of the "Purpose of the Stop" Test to Bus Encounters
In the typical bus sweep, the police are not boarding the buses
to interview witnesses to a crime. Instead, they are conducting a
criminal investigation of each passenger. The objective intent of the
officers is to look for drug trafficking. In this limited case, the of-
ficers would know going in that they need reasonable suspicion or
alternatively would need to advise people of their rights. Applying
this test to bus encounters will not severely hamper law enforcement
efforts to fight the "drug war," because there are alternatives avail-
able that can be more easily justified, under the Terry balancing test.
Police have no need to enter the bus to stop drug trafficking
when they are not looking for a particular person whom they know
is carrying drugs. The officers could stand outside the bus as the
passengers board and have a drug detection dog sniff the luggage as
207 Id. at 474.
208 Id. at 472 (footnote omitted).
209 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand jury, except in cases arising in the
land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
210 Butterfoss, supra note 157, at 468.
211 Id. at 472.
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passengers walk by. Since drug couriers typically carry guns, the use
of metal detectors would reduce the possibility of violence and may
inconvenience the courier enough that he would choose not to
travel by bus. Finally, x-ray devices similar to those used in airports
could be used to screen carry-on baggage while the passenger is still
in the bus terminal. All these methods are like a road block set up to
control drunk driving or a border check point set up to control ille-
gal immigration.2 12 Both of these situations have passed the Teny
balancing test. Although the methods may be intrusive, they do not
discriminate and they allow an individual an opportunity to avoid
the encounter.
3. Implementation of the Approach
Since the Supreme Court seems unwilling to pronounce a rule
that can be easily and consistently applied, Professor Butterfoss and
other commentators have concluded that the best alternative is to
leave the selection or development of the appropriate test to the
state courts.213 Unfortunately, this is not a viable option for the
Supreme Court of Florida because the relevant Florida constitu-
tional provision provides in part:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and against the
unreasonable interception of private communication by any means,
shall not be violated.... This right shall be construed in conformity with the
4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court .... -"214
Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, an-
other city where dragnet styled bus sweeps are conducted, is re-
strained from interpreting the Fourth Amendment contrary to the
United States Supreme Court. The District must follow the Supreme
Court because it has no constitution of its own and its court of ap-
peals has no authority to rule otherwise. 215 Thus, without new legis-
lation, in these jurisdictions the United States Supreme Court will
decide how much protection individuals will have against unwar-
ranted intrusions.
212 See, e.g., Martinez-Fuerte v. United States, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
213 Butterfoss, supra note 157, at 482.
214 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12 (emphasis added).
215 "The Supreme Court held in Bostick that the particular interdiction device [bus
sweep] which the police utilized in this case is not unconstitutional per se, and we are
bound to accept, and to follow fairly rather than grudgingly, its clear (but quite narrow)




The decision in Florida v. Bostick furthers the development of a
seizure test that incorporates a reasonable person standard that
does not represent reality. In particular, the majority failed to ap-
preciate the totality of the circumstances and overestimated the as-
sertiveness of the average person. As a result, law enforcement
officials are free to act in a coercive manner as long as they do not
commit blatant acts of intimidation. Such discretion, however, is
more than what is necessary to investigate drug trafficking on inter-
state and intrastate buses, and also fails to consider the Fifth
Amendment rights of a person who is questioned without reason-
able suspicion.
Professor Butterfoss' "purpose of the stop" test is the more ap-
propriate test for police encounters on buses. Since in drug in-
terdiction programs the officer's objective intent is easily
ascertained, the "purpose of the stop test" can be easily applied. If
the officers lack reasonable suspicion, then they would be prohibited
from approaching an individual to ask him or her questions about
his or her personal involvement in drug trafficking, or to request to
search his or her luggage. As an alternative, they could set up check
points in the bus terminal or outside of the bus.
Until a test similar to Professor Butterfoss' is adopted, the in-
terstate and intrastate bus passenger's Fourth Amendment rights
will continue to be violated. In view of the current direction of the
United States Supreme Court, Florida's best recourse is new state
legislation that would allow its own Supreme Court to develop a
seizure rule.
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